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The northwestern states of Punjab and Haryana have been amongst the most prosperous pockets 
of the post-independent India. Their prosperity has also produced positive development 
outcomes. Notwithstanding their low sex ratios, and the frequent invocation of “crises” of 
various kinds, the two states continue to lead the country on several indicators of human 
development. Though over the last two decades, the economic dynamism is often seen to be 
located in the southern and western parts of India, the two states have not seen any major decline 
in their economies, absolute or relative. On the contrary, in some respect, they seem to be still 
doing better than the so-called well-performing states of western and southern India. For 
example, as per the official figures1 of 2004-05, the proportions of population living below the 
officially defined poverty line in the states of Gujarat (17 percent), Maharashtra (31 percent) and 
Karnataka (25 percent) were significantly higher than those of Punjab (8 percent) and Haryana 
(14 percent).  
 
The development and prosperity of the two states has been a direct outcome of the green 
revolution technology introduced in the region during the late 1960s. Its positive effects on land 
productivity and incomes continued to unfold for more than two decades. So significant was the 
increase in productivity of land and production of food grains in the region that by the early 
1980s they alone contributed a majority share to the food reserves of the country. Interestingly 
even though the green revolution technology was introduced in several pockets of India, nowhere 
did it have a state-wide effect as it did in Punjab and Haryana.   
 
As would be expected, the effects of new agrarian technology were not merely economic. It 
transformed the relations of production, local level social structure and power relations. Though 
the introduction of modern democratic institutions of representation and governance began to 
change power relations everywhere in the country, their effect was much quicker and sharper in 
states like Haryana and Punjab. As in most other parts of the country, agricultural land in the 
region was mostly owned by a few caste groups. It was the “big” and “rich” landowners from 
these caste groups who suddenly emerged as the new regional elite and challenged the 
dominance of the erstwhile elite from traditionally “upper castes”. Unlike most other parts of 
India, the Punjab-Haryana region also has a single caste dominance, the Jats (commonly 
pronounced as Jutts in Punjab and Jaats in the Haryana region). Even though the two states have 
several other caste communities also owning agricultural land, none has the numbers and 
economic power to compete with Jats at the regional level.  
 
                                                 
1 Planning Commission, New Delhi. http://planningcommission.nic.in/ downloaded April 30 2011. 
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As expected a large majority of Jats live in rural areas. More importantly, they also took a lot of 
pride in being ruralites. An anthropologist who had conducted fieldwork in a Punjab village in 
1981-82 writes: ‘the Jat might be employed as a school teacher, or serve in the military but he 
saw his primary role as that of an agriculturist; his connection with land was what he held most 
dear and what identified him’ (Kaur 1986:2). Another anthropologist similarly observed that the 
Jats despised: 
 
…the townsman as lacking in physical bravery. They also had an image of them as  
grasping, greedy and lacking in dignity (Pettigrew 1992:169).  
 
The prosperity ushered in by the Green Revolution and growing importance of agrarian castes in 
the political arena gave the Jats a new confidence and visibility. Thus, over the years, the rustic- 
agrarian lifestyle came to be the norm in the region. In other words, this was the triumph of 
agrarianism, which not only gave the agrarian elite political power at the local and state level but 
also a sense of cultural hegemony. For example, though the land owning Jats had always been an 
important element of the Sikh community, it was only after the Green Revolution that the Sikh 
image came to be identified with the Jats (Gupta 1996; Pettigrew 1995). And, perhaps more 
importantly, despite its levels of urbanization and industrialization being above the national 
average, Punjab came to be popularly known as a land of prosperous agriculturists.  
 
Though its social profile is quite different from that of Punjab, similar kinds of political and 
cultural changes took place in Haryana as well.  For example, though numerically they make for 
less than a quarter of the total population, the post-green revolution Haryana has been popularly 
known as the Jat-land.    
 
Even in the second decade of the 21st century the Jat power continues to hold. Irrespective of the 
political party in power, caste identity of the regional political elite has not seen any change since 
the late 1960s. With the exception of Zail Singh of the Congress Party, all the Punjab chief 
ministers have been Jats during this period. More or less the same holds true for Haryana. Since 
1968, with the exception of Bhajan Lal (who too claims to represent an agrarian dominant caste), 
the chief ministers in Haryana have almost all been Jats2, with a visible agrarian identity and 
social base.  
 
However, notwithstanding the continued political dominance of a single agrarian caste in the 
region, no one seems to be celebrating agriculture or the rural life any longer. The only mode in 
which agriculture has been talked about in the region over the last two decades has been that of 
“crisis”. From Sikh militancy in Punjab during the 1980s and early 1990s to the reports of 
farmers committing suicides, depleting water tables and frequent reports of honour killings from 
                                                 
2 The only other non-Jat Chief-minister of Haryana during this period was Mr. Banarsi Das Gupta for year and a half 
during 1975-77 and again for month and a half during 1990.   
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Haryana, the region seems to be perpetually in a state crisis. Economists and popular 
commentators have offered rather simple and straight forward explanations, either in terms a 
general neglect of agriculture by the Indian state in the post-economic liberalization context, or 
simply a result of elite manipulation and/or incompetence of the political leadership (for a 
summary of this literature see Jodhka 2006).  
 
While there is no doubt about the fact that neo-liberal economic policy and the process of 
globalization have played a role in marginalizing agriculture, the source and nature of “crises” is 
not simply economic. They also reflect and suggest a process of change. Though the broader 
national and global economic contexts are important, the process of change should also be seen 
by locating it in the regional and local contexts.  
 
What exactly is happening to the rural society in different regions of the country? How are the 
old relations of caste, class and gender being renegotiated in the rapidly changing social, cultural 
and economic contexts? How have these changes affected local level power relations? How do 
the changing nature of caste relations and other aspects of local level social structure, in context 
of the growing integration of village in the wider networks of market and cultural universe, 
influence the value of agriculture?  
 
This paper is based on my fieldworks in Punjab and Haryana carried over the last ten years of so. 
I did an extensive survey of 51 villages of Punjab during 2000 and 2001. I revisited six of these 
villages during 2003-04. I also undertook an intensive field survey of two villages of the Karnal/ 
Panipat district of Haryana. I had first studied these villages during 1988-89 while doing 
fieldwork for my Ph.D. research. I discuss below the changing nature of caste and rural power in 
the rural northwest India based primarily on my field studies. In the final section I will try to 
draw some broad inferences on the possible nature of caste-power connection at the regional 
level.  
 
Caste in the northwest: Social and Historical Context 
 
The “mainstream” sociological writings, as also the popular discourses, tend to look at caste in 
unitary terms, a pan Indian reality, without any significant variations in its structure or ideology 
across different regions of the Subcontinent. The text book view of caste suggests an underlying 
cultural/ideological consensus across castes on its governing normative order. This is perhaps 
best reflected in the writings of scholars like Louis Dumont (1971) and Michael Moffatt (1979). 
Despite many criticisms of these theories and available empirical evidence from the field that 
contradicted such claims, theories such as that of Dumont continue to dominate the discourses on 
caste (Gupta 2000:3). Such views on caste tend to look at it almost purely in cultural terms, a 
system of values and ideas that is peculiarly Indian. Its association with Hinduism, where it 
supposedly had the sanction from some scriptural sources, further reinforces such a stance. The 
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fact that caste differences exist among non-Hindu Indians is invariably seen only as an evidence 
of their Hindu ancestry. 
 
Though caste, in a sense, is a pan Indian reality, its actual frames of reference are regional in 
character, which ought to be looked at historically. As is widely known, there are different sets 
of caste groups in different regions. Even ‘the preoccupation with purity and pollution was not 
equally marked in every part of the country’ (Beteille 2000:172). The specific historical 
trajectory, the patterns of politico-economic changes experienced during the colonial3 and post-
independence period and the composition of different ethnic communities determine the actual 
working of caste relations in a given region. Overlooking these obvious facts about caste also 
makes it appear like an unchanging reality.  
 
The institution of caste and practice of untouchability have perhaps always been a part of 
everyday life in the rural north-west India. However, the region has had its own specificities. For 
various historical reasons, the caste hierarchies and Brahmanical ideology in the region have 
been relatively less rigid when compared with some other parts of India. Until 1947, the united 
Punjab had a the majority Muslim population. Along with the Islam, the religious philosophy of 
Sikhism, majority religion in the present day Punjab, also decries caste. Caste appears to have 
survived and was reproduced in the region as a part of the agrarian social formation. A good 
amount of literature exists that points to the specificities of the practice of caste in the region. 
 
When they established their rule in the province some of the British colonial rulers appear to 
have been surprised at the absence of rigid caste hierarchy in the region. Some of the Western 
observers went to the extent of saying that the Punjab was a “notable exception” to the caste 
system in India (O’Malley in Nayar 1966: 20). Commenting on the status of “low castes” in the 
province, a colonial government report, for example, observed in 1920s: 
 
It would be misleading to attach too great importance to the existence of caste in the 
Punjab….Not only is it the case that the Brahman has no practical pre-eminence among 
Hindus, but as between “caste” and “non-caste” Hindus the distinction is not so strongly 
marked as to create the political problem found elsewhere in India.4 
 
Social differentiation in Punjab, some of them felt, resembled more with Europe than with the 
mainland India. As another observer wrote: 
 
                                                 
3. Some recent scholarship has begun to recognize this more explicitly. See Roger (2004); Caton (2004). 
 
4.  Great Britain Indian Statutory Commission, Memorandum Submitted by the Government of Punjab(1930) as in 
Nayar (1966:20). 
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Nowhere else in Hindu India does caste sit so lightly or approach so nearly to the social 
classes of Europe.5 
 
Though Brahmins as a caste community did exist in Punjab and continues to be there even today, 
they were ritually important only for the upper caste Hindus, who numerically constituted a 
small proportion of the total population of the state. Even among the Hindus of Punjab, 
Brahmins did not enjoy a superior status. Questioning the popular four-fold classification, Denzil 
Ibbetson in his census report on Punjab Castes argued that the varna model of hierarchy did not 
operate in Punjab at all and there were instances where Brahmins were “looked upon as outcasts 
by those who under the fourfold classification would be classed as Sudras” (Ibbetson 1916: 2). 
 
Similarly, writing on the social life in colonial Punjab, Prakash Tandon, an upper caste Khatri 
Hindu, comments in his celebrated autobiographical Punjabi Century that the Brahmins of 
Punjab lived a ‘frugal life’ and it was rare to find ‘an affluent Brahmin’ in the region (Tondon 
1961: 77). Most Brahmins in his native village were treated as members of the menial castes. 
Like other menials, they too were mostly dependent upon the food they collected from their 
jajmans. Giving a vivid description of their social status, he writes:  
 
With us brahmins were an underprivileged class and exercised little or no influence on 
the community. Perhaps Muslims had so discouraged temples and external worship that 
the brahmins had no place left from where to exercise their authority. 
Our brahmins did not as a rule even have the role of teachers, because until the British 
opened regular schools, teaching was done by Muslim mullahs in the mosques or by Sikh 
granthis... in the Gurudwaras. Our brahmins were rarely erudite; in fact many of them 
were barely literate, possessing only a perfunctory knowledge of rituals and knowing just 
the necessary mantras by heart. (Tandon 1961: 76) 
 
Similarly Saberwal, an anthropologist who studied a small town of Punjab during the late 1960s 
writes: 
 
…even if the Brahmins were able to carve a ceremonial place at Ranjit Singh’s court for 
themselves, there is no evidence that they acquired much land or that they were able to 
enforce the social circumstances that they would have required for maintaining high levels of 
ritual purity; and therefore the lowest castes in Punjab had to carry only a light burden of 
ritual impurities, much lighter, physically and socially, than the burden elsewhere in India. 
(Saberwal 1976:7). 
 
However, not everyone who has studied Punjab agrees with such a position. Paul Hershman, 
who did his fieldwork in a village near Jalandhar, for example underlines the distance that 
                                                 
5.    Anderson in ibid: 20. 
6 
 
existed between so called “upper castes”, such as Jats, Khatris and Aroras on one hand and the 
untouchable castes. Further, social relation in the village community and the political economy 
of agriculture in the region were closely structured around caste. While ideological stranglehold 
of Brahmanism and rigidities of caste hierarchy were certainly much weaker here, different 
groups of servicing castes were tied to the landowning cultivators within the framework of 
jajmani system, also known locally as sepidari system (see Sharma 1996; Kesinger 1974).  
 
I. P. Singh (1975; 1977), who did his field-work in a village near Amritsar during the late 1950s 
provides a fairly good idea about the nature of caste relations in a Sikh village. The Sikhs living 
in the village were divided into two groups, the Sardars (the upper castes) and the Mazhabis (the 
lower-caste scavengers). The first group included the Jats, Kambohs, Tarkhans, Kumhars, Sunars 
and Nais. Though the agriculturist Jats considered themselves higher than the other groups in this 
category, Singh found no feeling of caste-based avoidance or prejudice among them. They 
visited each other’s house, inter-dined, and attended marriage functions and celebrated most of 
the festivals together. In terms of the village settlement also, no demarcation existed in the 
houses of these groups. However, the Mazhabis, who constituted nearly half of the village 
population, were treated differently. They lived on one side of the village. They had a separate 
well while all the other castes used a common well. In the village feasts, where everyone was 
invited, the Mazhabis sat separately. Since many of them worked as labourers in the fields of the 
Jat landowners, the latter visited the houses of the Mazhabis but they did so as a patronizing 
gesture. There were also occasions where untouchability was either not practised or its extent 
had been declining.  
 
Virtually all agricultural land in Punjab-Haryana region has been under the direct control of the 
traditionally cultivating castes, particularly the Jats. The exclusion of Dalits from agrarian 
economy continues even today. For example, though the proportion of Scheduled Castes 
population is highest in Punjab, the agricultural land owned by them is virtually negligible. They 
constituted nearly 29 per cent of the total population of Punjab in 2001, (much higher than the all 
India average of around 16 per cent) and only around 5 per cent of them were reported to be 
working as cultivators. Though the proportions of SC population is lower in Haryana (19.3 
percent in 2001), their relationship to land is not very different from their counterparts in Punjab. 
Only 8 percent of them were listed as cultivators in the state in 2001 (http://censusindia.gov.in/ 
Tables_Published/SCST/dh_sc_haryana.pdf. May 9 2011). The all-India average of cultivators 
among the Scheduled Castes as a whole was above 25 per cent. In the neighboring Himachal 
Pradesh as many as 67.7 per cent of them were listed as cultivators. Even in Uttar Pradesh 42.6 
per cent of Dalits were cultivators6.  
 
                                                 
6 Journal of Indian School of Political Economy (special issue on Scheduled Castes edited by Andre Beteille). Vol. 
XII (3&4) 2000. Statistical supplement page 615.   
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Notwithstanding these specificities, the institution of caste not only existed everywhere in the 
region, but it also shaped or structured social, economic and political relations in the two states, 
particularly in the rural contexts. The colonial policies, such as the Land Alienation Act of 1901, 
would have played its role in reinforcing caste differences; particularly the economic exclusion 
of Dalits, its origin surely goes back in history7.  
 
Caste in Contemporary Rural Punjab  
Green revolution and other associated changes over the last three or four decades have 
significantly transformed the nature of caste relations in rural Punjab. On the basis of an 
extensive survey carried out in 2001 covering 51 villages selected from three sub-regions of 
Punjab, viz. Majha, Malwa, and Doaba I conceptualized this change through the categories of 
dissociation, distancing and autonomy (see Jodhka 2002).  
 
Dissociation: the Jajmani system, or its local variant the Balutedari system, provided a 
framework for organizing economic life in a village of the region. Different caste groups were 
typically required to pursue certain occupation deemed to be the calling of their caste. Though 
not everyone would have ever been employed in the “callings” of their castes, every caste group 
was identified with a specific occupation. It was in this kind of a framework that the involvement 
of Dalits with “unclean occupations” was viewed as the primary reason for their “pollution”. 
Dealing with dead cattle, scavenging and other occupations that were considered polluting in the 
Hindu culture were left to be done by the Dalits. Many radical changes have taken place in rural 
Punjab with regard to the involvement of Dalits with such occupations. 
 
First of all, large majorities of Dalits have consciously dissociated themselves from their 
traditional occupations. Only a small number of them (from less than 5 to a maximum of 10 
percent) would still be involved in such occupations. There were also caste-wise variations. The 
Chamars (including Ad Dharmis and Ramdasis) had almost completely moved away from their 
traditional occupation of dealing with dead cattle. They have even begun to distance themselves 
from agriculture and seek such employment that would not involve any relation with the locally 
dominant caste. This was also clearly evident in the two villages of Haryana in 2008-09. Many 
households had stopped keeping cattle because “no-one picked-up the dead cattle” and “the 
scavengers no longer came to clean the cattle-shed”.   
 
Who then did the work that was traditionally done by the Dalits, viz. scavenging or picking-up 
the dead cattle? And what implications do these changes have for the village economy and the 
traditional structure of jajmani relations?  Interestingly, some of these occupations were no 
longer identified with any specific caste group in rural Punjab. For example, picking up of dead 
                                                 
7 Under the Land Alienation Act in 1901, for example, Dalits and artisan castes were clubbed along with money-
lending and urban trading castes, and were disallowed to purchase land from the “agricultural castes”.  
 
8 
 
cattle has become a completely commercialized enterprise. The village panchayat generally gave 
the work on contract to an individual contractor, who could even be from another villages or a 
nearby town. They would typically employ a few workers (not necessarily local Dalits) who 
work on the dead cattle in the village carcass. Birds and dogs eat up much of the meat. The skin 
and the bones have a lucrative market. Most of those involved in this “business” were quite well 
off and were often seen with envy even by the upper castes.     
 
There has also been some degree of commercialization of other Dalit or jajmani occupations. 
Barbers, carpenters, blacksmiths, all now have shops. Along with commercialization, a process 
of dissociation of caste and occupation was also underway. There were many among Dalits who 
work as barbers. They, however, did not work the way barbers use to in the traditional structure 
of jajmani relations. Most of them have set-up small outlets, often near the village bus stop. 
Some Dalits have also taken-up the job of carpenters, particularly in villages where the 
traditional carpenters have left for the towns.   
 
The only “unclean occupations” where a degree of continuity existed was that of scavenging. 
Though a large majority of those involved with scavenging work continued to be the Balmikis 
and Mazhabis (earlier known as Chuhras), the castes with which it was traditionally identified, 
only a few families from these castes actually worked as scavengers.  
 
Even in scavenging, the traditional structure of jajmani relations has almost completely changed. 
The cleaning of drains and toilets or sweeping of the houses was mostly done on commercial 
basis. In most villages a scavenger is employed for an individual street. Each household in the 
street paid a fixed sum to the scavenger on a monthly basis (the current going rate was Rs.10 per 
household). Interestingly, in some cases, rather than in their own village the scavengers preferred 
working in the neighboring village. This was obviously done to avoid any element of familiarity 
and patronage of the traditional variety being invoked by the households they served. 
 
Distancing: A large majority of Dalits in Punjab and Haryana were traditionally employed in 
agriculture, mostly as labourers. Some of them also worked on long-term basis with the 
landowning Jats. Though the traditional variety of attached labour, such as sajhis and siris have 
given way to more formalized relations, working on long-term basis with farmers still leads to 
relations of dependency and unfreedom. When I did my fieldwork in Haryana during 1988-89 
attached labourers were mostly local Dalits. They obviously did not like getting into such 
arrangements.  
 
In the Doaba region where Dalit mobility has been more pronounced than elsewhere in the state, 
very few of them worked as attached labourers. Of the 13 villages studied from Doaba, none of 
the Dalits worked as attached labourer in as many as 8 villages. However, Malwa still had many 
who were working as attached labourers. Of the 26 villages studied, 21 had Dalits working as 
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attached labourers (ranging from 5 to 50 in each village). In Haryana villages also the number of 
labourers working as annual farm servants had significantly declined.  
 
On the whole the process of occupational diversification was quite pronounced everywhere. As 
and when they could afford to do so, Dalits stopped working regularly on land under the 
dominant caste farmers. In the villages of Doaba, for example, we were frequently told that much 
of the labour work was done by migrants and that the local Dalits did not want to work on land. 
They only performed seasonal labour and during rest of the year preferred going to work in the 
town or bringing work home. The most popular work that Dalits of Doaba did while living in the 
village was rope-making. These ropes were woven for the urban markets and were sold through a 
middleman who also supplied them with the raw materials required for the ropes. In Haryana 
villages also many Dalits went out to work, invariably more than the local OBCs. 
 
Autonomy: Viewed from below, the most pronounced feature of caste has been discrimination 
and the most obvious evidence of this is the settlement pattern in the village. Almost everywhere 
in Punjab and Haryana, Dalits have lived outside or in the periphery of the village. Along with 
their social segregation and economic deprivation, they also experienced discrimination and 
humiliation in everyday life of the village, during festivals and village feasts. This kind of 
discrimination took various forms. Dalits, for example, could not participate on equal terms in 
celebrations of local festivals unless they organized these celebrations on their own in their 
Gurudwaras or dharamshalas (community centres). Perhaps the most obvious occasion when 
Dalits are discriminated against in village festivities is during the serving of food. Dalits would 
often be asked to wait until everyone else had eaten and left. Though not so pronounced, there 
were also reports of using separate utensils for the Dalits during festivals or village feasts. A 
Dalit from village of Verka block of Amritsar, told us that though they were invited by the upper 
caste Jats for weddings in their families, they were served food and snacks on separate tables. 
 
Even otherwise Dalits and upper castes rarely ate together. Though prohibition on Dalits entering 
the houses of upper castes has been considerably relaxed, restrictions on eating together 
continued. As such also, Dalits and upper castes did not interact so closely that they would visit 
each other’s houses for lunches or dinners on a regular basis. 
 
During a group discussion with Dalits in a village of Firozepur district we were told that through 
subtle and not so subtle messages, they were told to stay away. Their children were asked to 
come for the langar (the food served in Gurudwra) after everyone else had finished eating. In 
another village in Mukatsar district, Dalits reported that they were often asked to sit in separate 
queues for the langar. While the Gurudwara management formally invited all the others, Dalits 
were not even informed about the special programmes and festivities. A frequent complaint was 
about not being allowed to participate in the cooking and serving of the langar. 
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The visible division between the upper castes and Dalits was with regard to the cremation 
grounds. Though there were some villages that had only one cremation ground where every one 
cremated their dead, the upper caste generally did not like Dalits using the village (upper caste) 
cremation ground. Interestingly, Dalits too preferred having their separate cremation grounds. In 
fact there were several cases where Dalits complained that they have to use the common 
cremation ground for cremating their dead because the dominant landowners had encroached 
upon the land where they had their cremation ground and had turned it into fields.  
 
The source of drinking water has been another area where the upper castes used to be very 
touchy. Traditionally Dalits and upper castes had different sources of drinking water even in 
rural Punjab. While all the upper castes (including the backward castes) could take water from 
the village wells, Dalits could never do so. They had to depend exclusively on their own wells. 
Much has changed with regard to the access to drinking water. Wells are no longer the primary 
source of drinking water anywhere in rural Punjab. While in some villages taps have been 
installed under government-funded programmes, at others hand- pumps have replaced wells. 
This change seems to have completely transformed the attitude of the rural population towards 
drinking water as a potential arena of caste prejudice. Though the sources of drinking water were 
as such separate for Dalits and the upper castes, there were much lesser restrictions on the access 
of Dalits to the taps and hand pumps used or owned by upper castes. However, it may be useful 
to add here that though Dalits could and did access water from the upper caste sources quite 
regularly, the frequency of upper castes taking water from the sources used by Dalits was much 
lesser, though not completely absent.  
 
Dalits have worked out their own ways and strategies of resisting this kind of discrimination. The 
most popular strategy of resistance has been to construct separate places of worship for 
themselves. Of the 51 villages studied, Dalits had separate Gurudwaras in as many as 41 villages. 
In fact there were some villages where they had more than one Gurudwara. In most cases 
separate Gurudwaras were built in order to assert autonomy and avoid the humiliation that they 
encountered in the dominant caste Gurudwaras. A Dalit of a village near Phagwara in Kapurthala 
district told us: 
 
There used to be only one Gurudwara in the village. The local Jats always thought that it 
was their Gurudwara because they were the ones who had financed its building. We used 
to visit the Gurudwara but they never liked it. They would not let us cook langar. So 
when we could mobilize some resources, we decided to build our own Gurudwara in our 
own basti. 
 
Construction of separate Gurudwaras by Dalits is no longer met with resistance either from the 
dominant castes in the village or from the religious establishment of the Sikh community. 
However, though the upper castes did not mind Dalits constructing their own Gurudwaras, some 
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Dalits reported that the Jats and other upper caste Sikhs did not have for their Gurudwaras the 
kind of reverence they had for their own. Even when the Dalit Gurudwara was closer, the Jats 
would prefer visiting their own Gurudwaras. Or when an upper caste family in the village needed 
to bring Guru Granth home, rarely would they take it from the Dalit Gurudwara, even when it 
was convenient to do so. There were some villages where the upper caste individuals had started 
visiting Dalit Gurudwaras, particularly during special occasions. 
 
As with Gurudwaras, rural Dalits of Punjab have also been building separate community centers 
of their own, sometimes with a grant from the Department of Social Welfare, sometimes with 
their own money. Having their own Gurudwaras and community centres gave them a sense of 
autonomy and reduced their dependence on the locally dominant caste. 
 
Caste and Local Power  
How do these processes of change translate into the local level institutional politics and voting 
patterns? My revisit after a gap of 20 years to two villages of Haryana could provide some 
indications to the emerging patterns and trends. 
   
Twenty years ago, the dominance in the two villages was clearly located in caste and land. The 
big landowners (the chaudharies) were also the most powerful individuals in these two villages 
of the Karnal district of Haryana and they were all members of the dominant caste. With the 
introduction of competitive politics, operationally the power of dominant individuals had to be 
institutionally reproduced through electoral politics. However, the new Constitution of the Indian 
republic granted universal adult franchise. Though initially it made little difference, over the 
years it became a source of a new sense of identity for those on the margins of rural Haryana, 
Dalits and the landless OBCs. ‘Every individual began to matter and everyone had a single vote’, 
was the way one of my Dalit respondents articulated the change in the local politics 20 years 
back.  
 
However, on the ground the local democratic politics worked through factional alliances. 
Factions were always vertical in nature, with some members of all castes being loyal to the 
leader, who was always a substantial landowner from a dominant caste. Even after the 
introduction of a representative system of electing local leaders came into force the big 
landowners, the chaudharies, of the village continued to enjoy influence in the local setting. 
However, they had to be constantly aware of the need to keep partners in the faction together.   
 
There have been some interesting changes in this over the last 20 years.  
 
Coupled with changes in the agrarian political economy and caste system, the democratic 
electoral system has radically transformed the authority structure of the village. “Chaudhar is a 
thing of past”, was a statement made by several of the big landowners. Another respondent from 
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a BC community articulated the general feeling of the landless castes towards the changing 
power structure in following words:  
 
No one cares for anyone simply because he thinks he is a chaudhary.  Chaudharies, if 
they are, they must be in their homes. We do not care. 
 
In other words there has been a clear decline in power of the ‘individual’ and the ‘individual 
family’ in local politics. ‘Power’ had become much more fluid and no more seemed to be 
determined, or solely shaped by caste and land. Though Jats were the big landowners in village-
II the sarpanch was from the caste of smaller landowners, Rors, who was a small farmer with 
around 6 acres of land. Village-I had an even more interesting trajectory. Here the big 
landowners were almost all Punjabi Aroras (Partition migrants from Western Punjab). A Punjabi 
landowning family commanded a lot of authority in the village. The patriarch of the family was 
also the sarpanch of the village for nearly 20 years. Upon his death, his eldest son became the 
sarpanch. However, over the last 10 years or so, the sarpanch was neither from this family nor 
from any other family of the big Punjabi landowners. Sarpanches now generally come from other 
castes, Gujjars or Brahmins, mostly small and middle size landowners, but ambitious and willing 
to work for a career in politics.  
 
What has brought this change about? What is the nature of the new power structure of the 
village? What are its effects on the regional or state-level politics? 
 
Perhaps the most important factor that has brought this change about is the general disintegration 
of the “village community”. As I have discussed for the Punjab villages above (also see Jodhka 
2002), in the Haryana villages too one could observe the processes of dissociation, distancing 
and autonomy. With the exception of a small number of those from the scavenging community, 
Dalit families of the village were no longer engaged in traditional caste occupations. They went 
out of the village for work, and many of them had regular employment. Their dependence on 
local landowners for credit also declined. They have also moved away or distanced from the 
agrarian economy of the village and they rarely, if ever participated in the ritual life of the 
village, or the other caste groups on any occasion. In other words, they no longer saw themselves 
as being a part of the social order of the caste system. This has also given them a sense of 
independence and political agency. 
 
The other “poor” communities of the village, the so-called BCs, too have alternative sources of 
employment outside agriculture and many of them indeed go out of the village for work. 
However, smaller number of the have regular government employment.  
 
Do the local poor feel politically empowered? The answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. As I have 
discussed above, the disintegration of traditional hierarchical structure has given them a sense of 
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citizenship and they are quite aware of their political rights. They interact and participate in the 
larger world of caste and community politics at the regional level, which, given a set of political 
resources, they can use in times of crisis. However, they are also acutely aware of their 
vulnerabilities that come with poverty and marginality. When I asked a respondent from the 
Jimmar community as to why they do not contest elections and become sarpanches, his answer 
was very candid: 
 
…We are poor people. We know our votes are more than any other caste community of 
the village. However, we also know our place (aukat). I want to live in this village. If I 
were to take your words seriously, I may even have to leave the village. 
 
Some other respondents also pointed to the money one has to spend to contest an election for the 
position of sarpanch,  
 
“…. at least a few lakhs…., who is going to fund it”. 
 
Who has inherited power from the traditional patriarchs?  
 
The village politics today is integrated much more with the regional politics and the bureaucratic 
structure and is shaped by a large number of factors. A new class of “political entrepreneurs”, 
who are not necessarily rich but are invariably from upper or dominat caste groups, seem to be 
the main actors in the emerging political scenario. They are required to have skills of 
coordinating on the other hand with the outside world of politics and development bureaucracy 
and on the other with the local population. They have to try to link themselves organically with 
different caste communities and convince them about their abilities to represent them. Given 
their sense of pride and arrogance, the old chaudharies find it difficult to do such things.  
 
While some villagers complained about the local sarpanches being implicated in corruption cases 
and one sarpanch was suspended on some charges of corruption in the month of April 2008, they 
do have to be much more accountable and performance oriented than before. Development 
programmes indeed have better chances of being implemented in the emerging atmosphere of 
competitive politics at the village level.  
 
Concluding Comments 
 
How do these processes of change at micro level in Punjab and Haryana manifest themselves at 
other levels, in the regional, state and national politics?  
 
As I mentioned in the first section of this paper, on the face of it, nothing seems to have changed 
at the regional/state level politics. The locally dominant castes continue to dominate regional 
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politics in both the states, irrespective of the party in power. However, a closer look suggests 
something very different. We can identify three sets of processes that seem to be changing the 
social grammar of politics in the region. First and foremost is the sudden rise in caste related 
conflicts at the local/village level. Second, and a related process, is the rise of new subaltern 
caste/religious identities, most visible among the Ravi Dasis in the Doaba region of Punjab but 
also among other communities, such as the Valmikis. The third important trend clearly visible at 
the village level was a shifting class base of the local political and the changing mode of 
reproduction of caste power in electoral domain through newer means, particularly money and 
“service delivery”.  
 
The disintegration of jajmani relations and decline of tradition hierarchy through the process of 
dissociation, distancing and autonomy creates a new space for Dalit agency and assertion of 
identity, directly leading to the development of ‘political capacity’ to use James Manor’s 
expression. Evidence of this could be seen in the states of Punjab and Haryana, which have been 
experiencing a series of caste related conflicts, mostly among rural Dalits and landowning Jats, 
particularly over the decade. 
 
In recent times, perhaps the first major case of caste conflict and Dalit assertion was reported 
from the Doaba region of Punjab. In the first week of June 2003 in a village called Talhan, 
located at a distance of around ten kilometres from the town of Jallandhar, an ongoing conflict 
between the landowning Jats and the Dalit Ad-dharmis reached a flash point. The tension was so 
sharp that the local administration had to intervene and had to seal off the village for a couple of 
days.  
 
Relations between the two communities in the village had been quite strained for some time over 
the issue of the Dalits’ demand for participation in the management of a local shrine. As 
mentioned above, different caste communities generally have their separate Gurudwaras. In 
Talhan Dalits also have a Gurudwara of their own. The disputed shrine did not really belong to 
any particular caste. It was built in memory of a Sikh artisan who died while fixing wheel in a 
newly dug well. Since he died while working for the village, he was declared a martyr (shahid) 
and the villagers erected a small structure (smadh) in his memory, at the place where he was 
cremated. Over the years, the smadh began to attract devotees. With devotees came money. It 
was gradually turned into a proper religious shrine and the Sikh holy book was also placed close 
to the smadh. The locally dominant Jats who controlled the village panchayat appointed a 
committee to look after this shrine.  
 
Though this committee had members from different caste groups, never was a Dalit made 
member of this committee, even though they make up for nearly two-thirds of the total 
population of the village. Given their numbers no one could be elected sarpanch of the village 
without their support. However, when they demanded representation in management of the 
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shrine, the Jats refused. The Ad Dharmis approached the local administration and even the court 
of law. It was during one of the demonstrations by them in the town of Jallandhar that violence 
broke out and the police opened fire in which one Dalit was killed. 
 
The agitation continued for nearly six months and eventually the Ad dharmis were 
accommodated in the managing committee. Though it did not significantly alter the power 
equation either at the local level or in the region, the story of Talhan became an inspiring case for 
the Dalits elsewhere in Punjab. In the past seven or eight years there have been more than a 
dozen cases where the local level tensions have come out in the open and have been reported in 
the local newspapers. The issues of contention vary from village to village. They range from 
demanding a share in the agricultural lands owned and leased out by the village panchayat; 
drainage rights; or simply contesting elections for panchayat position against the Jats.  
 
However, notwithstanding the divergent nature of issues, all these stories have a common theme 
of thread. Everywhere Dalits are making new claims. They are asking for equal rights and a 
legitimate share in the resources that belong commonly to the village but had so far been in the 
exclusive control of the locally dominant caste. Perhaps the most interesting feature of these 
conflicts is that though the issues are all local in nature, the language and politics they deploy in 
their struggle is “imported” from outside the village. Similarly, these conflicts do not remain 
local. The regional and national media reports them almost instantly. They tend to also mobilize 
the regional and national political elite and parties. The courts and civil society organizations 
also get involved and their views have begun to matter, with local administration and also with 
the local upper caste elite.  
 
However, this emergence of Dalit agency or ‘political capacity’ is not simply a matter of political 
mobilizations or an outcome of the disintegrating hierarchies. It also depends greatly on the 
abilities of a community to consolidate and mobilize its social networks and economic resources.  
As Manor rightly points out:  
 
The old caste hierarchies were rooted in materiality.  They did not just exist in people’s 
minds – at the level of ideas, beliefs and imaginings.  Those things were important, but 
there was a great deal more to this than mere ‘false consciousness’.  Caste and caste 
hierarchies had – and still have – tangible substance (Manor 2010:12).   
 
It is in this context that one should understand the process of community identity formation 
among Dalits. Apart from giving them a sense of dignity, communitarian identities also bring 
together all the available social and cultural resources of its members. A good case study of this 
would be the Ravi Dasi religious identity in Punjab and how over the years they have quite 
successfully developed their own social, cultural and economic resources. Economic mobility 
experienced by a few Chamar families of the community during the 1920s and 1930s and the 
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resources available with the diasporic members of community settled in England and Canada are 
all brought together in conflicts like the one experience in Talhan (see Jodhka 2004; 2009; 2010).  
 
Disintegration of traditional hierarchies or Jajmani relations also do not mean end of inequalities. 
The cultural inequalities have always also been economic inequalities. With exception of a few 
individuals or specific sections of the communities, Dalits and landless OBCs continue to be 
among the most poor in contemporary India. It was through their economic might that the 
traditional rural rich was able to reproduce itself as the ruling political elite at the regional level. 
However, its power has begun to be contested. If it cannot deliver through good governance, it 
will have to constantly work through populist state policies (coupled with electoral corruptions!), 
and this is what we have been increasingly seeing in the region over the last decade and more.  
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